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ABSTRACT 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are often accused of taking advantage of lax 
environmental regulations in developing countries.  However, no quantitative analysis of the 
impact of doing business in nations of different income levels on environmental corporate social 
responsibility (ECSR) has been done prior to this study.  Incorporating institutional factors in our 
approach, we argue that endoisomorphic and exoisomorphic pressures relating to ECSR impact 
MNEs differently according to the MNEs’ level of activity in low-, lower-middle-, upper-
middle-, and high-income nations.  We predict and, using data from 113 companies, find that 
selling in poorer nations is positively associated with increased levels of ECSR. Our research 
suggests that MNEs may not be participating in a “race to the bottom” but may instead be 
responding to global institutional pressure by exceeding local norms for environmental 




Do multinational entities (MNEs) pollute more in countries where they think they can get 
away with it?  How can we understand what makes one MNE pursue environmental corporate 
social responsibility (ECSR) and another one not?  Aguinis and Glavas (2012) suggest that 
stakeholders’ expectations of economic, social, and environmental performance define corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and thus influence organizations’ CSR policies and actions. Sandhu 
(2010) proposes that MNEs are increasingly pressured to be environmentally responsible. 
Pressures from internal and external stakeholders may explain why MNEs behave as they 
do.  Endoisomorphic pressure, the pressure to conform to standards internal to the MNE, and 
exoisomorphic pressure, the pressure to conform to the standards of the external environment, 
may push an organization in different directions (Souitaris et al. 2012).  How these pressures 
interact to influence the ECSR of MNEs has not yet been studied.  Our study examines ECSR in 
an international context, drawing on institutional theory to explore the endoisomorphic and 
exoisomorphic pressures they face and observe how these pressures interact to shape how MNEs 
approach ECSR.   
 Institutional differences are important to international business research, and thus to 
studying ECSR in an international context (Kolk and van Tulder 2010).  Institutional differences 
influence the scope of strategic options and decision-making (Lu et al. 2009; Meyer et al. 2009; 
Peng 2003; Rothenberg 2007; Tan 2009; Tang and Hull 2012).  Peng (2003) argues powerfully 
that institutional pressures shape strategy, and that strategies change in response to different 
institutional pressures.  Lu, et al. (2009) found that institutional contexts moderate the effects of 
corporate governance on export behavior.  Meyer, et al. (2009) found that MNEs choose 
different entry modes in different institutional contexts.  Rothenberg (2007) studied the 
differences between environmental managers and environmental performance in two plants 
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facing different institutional pressure, and found that institutional differences provoke significant 
differences in ECSR.  Tang and Hull (2012) found that Chinese institutional pressures caused 
entrepreneurial-oriented companies to behave differently than similar companies in Western 
markets, while Tan (2009) examined socially irresponsible behavior in MNEs in China using an 
institutional perspective, finding support for the premise that Chinese institutional pressures 
encourage irresponsible behavior.  Formal regulatory institutions set the rules concerning 
environmental standards; however, informal institutional factors such as norms and ethics shape 
what is acceptable with respect to adhering to formal regulations.  And the array of institutional 
settings MNEs face complicates how strategic ECSR works (McWilliams and Siegel 2011).  In 
our study the classification of economies using the World Bank income classification captures 
whether formal institutions or informal institutions dominate the rule-setting system. 
Consider the institutional context in developing nations, which are vulnerable to 
economic exploitation, including environmental degradation (Arora and Dharwadkar 2011; Hart 
1995).  MNEs may see this vulnerability as an opportunity to reduce costs, or as an opportunity 
to create a sustainable competitive advantage through environmental stewardship (Hart 1995; 
Mross and Rothenberg 2007; Porter and Kramer 2011).  But which opportunity MNEs pursue 
will vary according to the full set of endo- and exoisomorphic pressures they face.   To try to 
answer the following question, our study examines ECSR-related pressures on MNEs: 
When do the effects of endoisomorphic and exoisomorphic pressures lead MNEs to exploit weak 
environmental regulations in host countries, and when do they lead MNEs to do more than the 
regulations require? 
Our approach to this question is quantitative rather than qualitative.  Rather than studying 
a single company in depth, we study over 100 companies, and conduct statistical analysis on the 
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resulting data.  This quantitative approach supplements qualitative approaches, allowing us to 
build on studies such as Souitaris, et al. (2012), whose rich and in-depth examination of six 
corporate venture capital programs helped lay the foundation for the present study.  While the 
present study lacks the detail of a qualitative approach, our large sample size offers the 
advantage of more generalizable findings.  Our study builds on theoretical and qualitative work 
to statistically examine the effects of endoisomorphic and exoisomorphic pressures on MNE 
behavior.   
We next briefly review the CSR and ECSR literature, and then develop our hypotheses.  
Our sample, data collection, measures, and analysis follow in the methods section.  We then 
present the results and discuss our findings, potential directions for future research, and our 
study’s implications. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INTERNATIONALLY 
ECSR is increasingly important to managers (Aguilera-Caracuel, Aragon-Correa et al. 2012; 
Aguilera-Caracuel, Hurtado-Torres et al. 2012; Holtbrugge and Dogl 2012).  The relationship 
between social benefit and corporate performance does not have to be a zero-sum game (Porter 
and Kramer 2006), but businesses have not fully recognized the benefits of ECSR (Mross and 
Rothenberg 2007; Porter and Kramer 2011).  Not all environmental practices lead to competitive 
advantage (Basu and Palazzo 2008). Hart (1995) argues the firms may engage in ECSR along 
three dimensions:  controlling and preventing pollution; minimizing environmental product life 
cycle cost; and achieving sustainable development to harmonize economic activity and the 
environment.  ECSR often involves exceeding legal requirements, particularly where 
requirements are low (Chiu and Sharfman 2011). 
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As legal requirements may vary from country to country, managing ECSR is more 
complex for MNEs than for domestic companies.  For example, two similar plants in different 
countries, with the same parent MNE, approached environmental performance differently 
because of local differences in institutional pressure (Rothenberg 2007).  A case analysis of a 
dozen mining firms found that home-nation norms may influence subsidiary ECSR, but while 
there is increasing environmental and other CSR activity in emerging markets, MNEs tend to 
stoop to host nation standards when those standards are lower (Gifford et al. 2010).  Other case 
studies have yielded similar results (Eweje 2009; Muthuri and Gilbert 2011), a common finding 
being that subsidiary managers believe they should meet only the lower standards of the nations 
in which they operate.   
Nations may be engaging in a “race to the bottom,” a rush to reduce environmental and 
other regulations to attract and retain predatory MNEs (Madsen 2009; Williamson et al. 2006).  
If so, MNEs may face exoisomorphic pressure to take part in this unseemly race.  In Lebanese 
cases, weak formal regulatory institutions discouraged CSR (Jamali and Mirshak 2007, 2010).  
Halter and de Arruda (2009) show that MNEs exploit developing nations with weak formal 
institutional constructs, as a lack of transparency promotes corruption.  A recent longitudinal 
study (Tang and Smith 2012) suggests that governments in developing economies help 
companies they favor elude pressure to be environmentally responsible.  Decision-makers in host 
countries may be pressured into lowering their standards if local norms are lower than in their 
home nation (Bailey and Spicer 2007; Kliukinskaitė-Vigil 2011).  Or MNEs may enter markets 
with low environmental standards specifically to exploit those standards, just as criminals may 
be drawn to areas where the law is weak in order to better pursue their criminal activities (Arora 
and Dharwadkar 2011; Ghemawat 2007).   
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On the other hand, MNEs may choose to exceed local environmental standards 
(Christmann and Taylor 2001; 2006).  Local managers may push for higher standards than are 
required locally (Reimann et al. 2012), and firms active in poorer nations have been shown to 
achieve higher environmental performance (Baughn et al. 2007; Chapple and Moon 2005; 
Kennelly and Lewis 2002; Shah and Rivera 2007).  In particular, Baughn et al. (2007) found that 
CSR activity is subject to home nation pressures: MNEs behave better abroad if based in nations 
with strong rather than weak formal institutional pressure.  Mross and Rothenberg (2007) found 
that internal pressure from top management drove environmental performance, suggesting that 
an MNE’s internal environmental standards may outweigh external institutional pressures. 
MNEs might not simply adopt home or host national standards.  China-based managers 
have been found, contrary to expectations, to attribute greater importance to stakeholders than do 
U.S.-based managers (Shafer et al. 2007).  Lo et al. (2008) found no significant differences in 
environmental policy in firm-reported levels of CSR for Chinese and U.S. firms.  In 
Rothenberg’s (2007) two-plant study, managers in the plant facing weaker local environmental 
regulations were motivated by pressure from inside the MNE, while in the plant facing stricter 
local regulations, managers were primarily concerned with keeping external forces at bay.  
MNEs tend to invest in nations with environmental standards similar to their home markets, 
suggesting they try to avoid nations that require changes to their environmental policies (Madsen 
2009). Thus, how MNEs adjust their environmental performance in relation to external 
institutional factors is not yet established. 
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INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CSR ACROSS NATIONAL 
BORDERS 
Firms take actions, including environmental ones, to improve the bottom line and create 
competitive advantage (Kim and Statman 2012; McWilliams and Siegel 2011; Porter and 
Kramer 2006, 2011).  Some evidence indicates high ECSR leads to improved financial 
performance (Clarkson et al. 2011; Pils and Rothenberg 2003; Russo and Fouts 1997; Waddock 
and Graves 1997). Yet the finding of a non-linear relationship between environmental and 
financial performance suggests that managers may adjust ECSR in response to isomorphic 
pressures (Kim and Statman 2012).  If they do adjust to this pressure, variation in institutional 
factors may cause variation in how they approach ECSR.  For firms operating across multiple 
borders, local institutional contexts affect competitive advantages such as those stemming from 
high ECSR (McWilliams and Siegel 2011; Moss 2005), so an MNE’s strategic environmentalism 
could differ from country to country.  Both formal and informal institutions are central to the 
strategic opportunities and behaviors of firms, including environmental performance (Hitt et al. 
2004; Meyer et al. 2009; Peng 2003; Rothenberg 2007).  Thus the institutional contexts that 
shape an MNE’s environmental strategy are likely to vary significantly according to differences 
in institutional pressures (Tang and Hull 2012). 
MNEs may face external pressures from home- and host-country institutional factors and 
from global institutional factors.  High-income nations generally exert the strongest national 
institutional pressure to enact the highest level of environmental performance.  The pressure is 
lower in middle-income nations (and lessens from upper- to lower-middle income), and lowest in 
low-income nations (Chapple and Moon 2005; Eweje 2009; Gifford et al. 2010; Halter and de 
Arruda 2009; Husted and Allen 2006; Li et al. 2010; Muthuri and Gilbert 2011).  This correlation 
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is one of the few things about which research in this area is in general agreement.  Our study thus 
focuses on the environmental performance of MNEs across nations of different wealth levels, 
and is the first study we know of to use quantitative data to empirically evaluate the impact of 
MNE activity in low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle-, and high-income nations on environmental 
corporate social responsibility.  
While MNEs face multiple national institutional environments, each exerting isomorphic 
pressures on subsidiaries to conform (Bailey and Spicer 2007; Kliukinskaitė-Vigil 2011), 
national exoisomorphic pressures may not wholly determine strategic decisions (Souitaris, et al. 
2012).  MNEs may face global exoisomorphic pressures, such as NGOs seeking global 
improvements to ECSR practice, industry association influences, or global standards.  When 
global organizations exert the greatest isomorphic pressure, MNEs may be moved to increase 
ECSR in tandem with international expansion to maintain or improve international legitimacy 
(Aguilera-Caracuel, Hurtado-Torres et al. 2012; Bansal 2005).  In this situation global 
exoisomorphic pressures are dominant.  When national pressures dominate, subsidiaries 
acquiesce to local institutional pressures, so the same MNEs have different levels of ECSR in 
different countries. 
Or subsidiaries may follow parent policies when endoisomorphism – internal 
environmental pressure – drives MNE decision-making (Souitaris et al. 2012).  Friedman (1970) 
suggests that the business of business is to earn profits.  This perspective, epitomized by the 
questionable adage – “If you aren’t cheating you aren’t trying hard enough.” – seems to obligate 
businesses to play dirty to maximize profits.  By this view, MNEs cannot be trusted to behave 
ethically (Arora and Dharwadkar 2011; de Jonge 2011).  Responding to endoisomorphic 
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pressure, they exploit the lowest standards, taking advantage of countries where environmental 
regulations are weak (Ghemawat 2007).   
But managers often try to live up to their home-nation standards (Kliukinskaitė-Vigil 
2011; McDonald and Kan 1997).  If they realize that ECSR is profitable, MNEs can choose a 
strategy of environmental responsibility for financial reasons (Campbell 2007; Kim and Statman 
2012; Mross and Rothenberg 2007; Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011; Price 2008; van Beurden and 
Gössling 2008).  Thus if home-nation environmental standards are high and they believe 
environmental responsibility increases profits, managers in countries with low environmental 
standards will try to exceed those standards (Campbell 2007; McWilliams and Siegel 2011).  The 
endoisomorphic pressure to maximize profits may thus manifest itself as a drive either to exploit 
or to exceed lower standards.   
MNEs tend to standardize to improve performance (Levitt 1983) and managers may 
prefer their home-country standards (Kliukinskaitė-Vigil 2011).  Standardization may improve 
ECSR (Aguilera-Caracuel, Hurtado-Torres et al. 2012; Christmann and Taylor 2006, 2003).  
MNEs in which endoisomorphic pressure dominates and managers believe standardized ECSR 
optimizes financial performance will standardize their ECSR in all markets.  The exoisomorphic 
pressures resulting from internationalization are relatively unimportant to them and do not affect 
their ECSR.  
MNEs may favor exploitation when possible (Arora and Dharwadkar 2011; Madsen 
2009; Shafer et al. 2007; Tan 2009), leading to a standardization strategy in which the parent 
MNE directs its subsidiaries to exploit local institutional weaknesses.  In such cases the 
endoisomorphic pressures to exploit lax institutional pressures align with national exoisomorphic 
pressures for lower standards, and the MNE may push for even lower standards. 
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Because the institutional differences among these nations are so large, it seems 
reasonable to expect that no one isomorphic pressure will dominate in each income category.  In 
some situations, endoisomorphic pressures may dominate, in others, exoisomorphic.  No one 
endo- or exoisomorphic pressure dominates ECSR choice in every income-level market. The 
effect of sales in each of the four income-level categories on environmental performance will 
vary depending upon which isomorphic pressure is the strongest in that category.   
 
Hypothesis 1. We will observe different relationships between sales and environmental 
performance of MNEs in nations of different income level. 
 
Sales in each income-level category may positively, negatively, or insignificantly affect 
an MNE’s ECSR.  If national exoisomorphic pressures to localize environmental standards 
dominate in lower-income nations, those pressures will have a negative effect on ECSR.  Strong 
endoisomorphic pressures to exploit lax environmental standards in lower-income nations would 
have a similar effect.  But we do not expect these pressures to be dominant.  Home-nation 
institutional pressures for ECSR are usually high, and poor ECSR anywhere could hurt the firm’s 
reputation at home and put the expected financial benefits of ECSR at risk (McWilliams and 
Siegel 2011).  If global exoisomorphic pressures dominate, we will observe a positive 
relationship between sales to lower-income-level categories and MNEs’ environmental 
performance. 
A strategy of applying home-nation standards globally, driven by endoisomorphic 
pressures to standardize, may not capture all the benefits of ECSR.  If the MNE optimizes its 
ECSR only on a home-country basis, the firm forgoes the potential global benefits of ECSR.  
11 
 
Global exoisomorphic pressures may push MNEs to use environmental strategies that exceed 
home-nation standards, improving firm performance (Campbell 2007; Porter and Kramer 2006).  
McWilliams and Siegel (2011) argue that high environmental performance leads to competitive 
advantage due to (1) reputational effects, (2) personnel cost advantages, and (3) capital cost 
reductions. The reputational effects enhance revenue and lower cost (McWilliams and Siegel 
2011).  For MNEs, the lowered costs may include foreign market entry cost.  Many MNEs could 
bring capital, managerial know-how, technical know-how, and similar competencies to markets 
lacking these factors.  But all else equal, MNEs known to be careful about polluting may be 
preferred over rivals.  We predict that for markets with lower environmental institutional 
standards, MNEs will prefer a positive environmental performance strategy to one of 
exploitation or standardization.   
 
Hypothesis 2. Sales to low-income nations are positively associated with MNE ECSR. 
Hypothesis 3. Sales to lower-middle-income nations are positively associated with MNE ECSR. 
 
Dominant exoisomorphic pressure will lead firms to adopt similar ECSR policies, but 
dominant endoisomorphic pressure may not.  Endoisomorphic pressure will be more dependent 
on factors other than the nations in which MNEs do business.  Upper-middle-income nations 
exert greater institutional pressure for ECSR than do lower-middle- and lower-income nations.  
We do not expect endoisomorphic pressures to exploit local environmental standards to dominate 
in upper-income nations because: (1) the potential benefits are lower in upper-middle-income 
nations, and (2) the negative reputational effects are too great. 
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But in upper-middle-income nations the exoisomorphic pressure to conform to global 
standards will not be as high as for low- and lower-middle-income nations.  Upper-middle-
income nations have higher ECSR expectations than poorer nations, and the marginal benefit of 
increasing ECSR will be lower.  Low-income nations have high ECSR potential; high-income 
nations do not (Lauder 2010).  Endoisomorphic pressures concerning ECSR in this setting, while 
perhaps strong, may vary considerably from firm to firm.  For the same reasons that regulations 
concerning ECSR are stricter in upper-middle-income nations than in lower-income nations, the 
ability to realize differentiation advantages rather than cost advantages will be higher, and MNEs 
may be motivated to differentiate based on something other than ECSR in upper-middle-income 
nations.  Innovation and marketing are such alternatives, known to work (Hull and Rothenberg 
2008; McWilliams and Siegel 2000) so long as the repercussions of exploitative actions can be 
controlled (Miles et al. 2002, 2004; Tang and Smith 2012).  The effort required to exceed local 
standards in upper-middle-income nations is considerably greater than it is in poorer nations with 
lower standards, so if endoisomorphic pressure dominates, it will be the pressure to standardize.  
Standardizing lets MNEs satisfy national standards and conserve their resources to invest in 
other differentiating factors that yield higher returns in upper-middle-income nations.  This leads 
to our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4.  We will not observe a significant relationship between sales to upper-middle-
income nations and MNE ECSR.   
 
In high-income nations, with the strongest national exoisomorphic institutional pressure 
to achieve high levels of ECSR, MNEs will generally pursue ECSR. Wealthier nations can afford 
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to be more concerned about the long-term effects of polluting and other environmentally 
unsound practices.  In these nations, the reputational benefits, personnel cost advantages, and 
capital cost reductions stemming from high environmental performance (McWilliams and Siegel 
2011) are matched with strong penalties for failing to meet local standards (Miles et al. 2002, 
2004).  MNEs are thus more vulnerable to institutional pressures in these nations than they are in 
others.  MNEs prefer a consistent policy across all nations in which they operate, and the 
endoisomorphic pressure to standardize is greatest when they operate in nations with similar 
exoisomorphic pressure for high levels of ECSR (Madsen 2009).  It may be that institutional 
pressures in wealthy nations are such that it is most profitable to pursue high environmental 
performance in all of them (Porter and Kramer 2011).  Endoisomorphic pressure to exploit lax 
environmental situations will be minimal.  If an MNE is disposed toward a strategy of 
exploitation, there are better opportunities to pursue such a strategy in lower-income nations.  
The exoisomorphic pressure to meet global standards will not be the dominant pressure because 
the global standards originate in the wealthiest nations, and national standards will resemble the 
global standard.  Instead, endoisomorphic pressures to standardize will dominate.  Thus, our last 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5.  We will not observe a significant relationship between sales to high-income 





Sample and Data Collection 
We identified companies for our study from the widely used Environmental, Social, and 
Governance factors (ESG) database maintained by Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI).  The MSCI ESG Indices are the current form of the indices developed over the past 20 
years by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD); these indices were acquired by MSCI in 2010.  
We matched this dataset with the companies’ financial data (including activity in different 
markets) from the Compustat database.  Because Compustat has limited data on international 
activity, we identified only 113 firms with complete data.   
Measures 
Dependent variable 
We adopt the 2009 environmental performance measure from the ESG dataset.  In this 
dataset, the ESG’s environmental performance scale includes two categories with seven dummy 
items for positive performance (or strengths) and seven dummy items for negative performance 
(or concerns).  As is common with studies using the KLD/ESG data set (e.g., Hull and 
Rothenberg 2008), we calculated the 2009 environmental performance measure by deducting the 
sum of the seven concern items from the sum of the seven strength items, creating a continuous 
variable as our dependent variable.  
Independent variables 
 In a study of the effects of FDI and portfolio investment flows on economic growth, de 
Vita and Kyaw (2009) argue that the World Bank country classification system, which is based 
on gross national income per capita, captures institutional differences.  Using a dynamic panel 
model and a large data set spanning 126 countries over an 18-year period, they empirically 
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confirm the existence of differing effects by World Bank country classifications (de Vita and 
Kyaw 2009).  We anticipate that their study will set a standard, given their extensive 
demonstration of how the World Bank classifications capture institutional differences, and the 
ease with which the typology they demonstrate can be used.  Using their system, we classify the 
countries in which any of the 113 companies in our sample has sales according to the four World 
Bank categories: high-income market, upper-middle-income market, lower-middle-income 
market, and low-income market. The average of a company’s percentage of sales in each market 
out of total sales in both 2007 and 2008 is used to measure each type of market’s importance to 
that company.  We use the two-year average to curb abnormal fluctuation in the annual sales 
value.   
Control variables 
 We controlled for variables that have been found to affect the likelihood of a firm’s 
pursuing environmental performance. The first, organizational slack, is “a cushion of actual or 
potential resources which allow an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for 
adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy 
with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois 1981, p. 30).  Slack has a positive impact 
on social performance (Bowen 2002; Sharma, 2000).  The more slack resources a firm has, the 
more it can spare for pollution prevention, recycling, and other elements of environmental 
performance.  We included the average ratio of long-term debts to total assets for 2007 and 2008 
to control for slack (Chatterjee 1990; Reuer and Ragozzino 2005; Singh 1986).  This ratio is an 
inverse measure of organizational slack.  The smaller the ratio, the more slack the firm has, since 
it has less need to go outside for funding. 
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 We also controlled for firm size, as larger firms may have a stronger motive to engage in 
good environmental practices.  The larger they are, the more visible they are, so they stand to 
benefit more from a good reputation and to suffer more from a bad one.  Even the most cynical 
large firms may not want to be a target for government regulations and NGO campaigns 
(Luxmore and Hull 2011; Miles et al. 2002, 2004).  Larger firms may also be better able to 
handle complicated environmental strategies, as they are more familiar with diversified 
operations.  To control for the effects of firm size we included the logarithm of the number of 
employees the company had in 2009 in our model.  As a robustness check, we ran our equations 
again controlling for the logarithm of total assets instead of number of employees, and obtained 
essentially the same results, with the same level of support for all hypotheses.  We retain the 
employee-based measure because another one of our variables, organizational slack, is based in 
part on total assets.  Using the number of employees thus reduces multicollinearity issues. 
 Because the industry in which a firm competes may impact the relevance of 
environmental practices, we included this in the model as well.  Industry is a dummy variable, 
with 1 indicating manufacturing industries and 0 indicating service industries. 
 Past environmental performance is a good predictor of future environmental activity, so 
we included the firm’s 2007 and 2008 average ESG environmental score, the deduction of the 
sum of the concern items from the sum of the strength items, in our model. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We used multivariate linear regression (OLS) to analyze the hypotheses. Table 1 shows the 
means, standard deviations, and correlations of the model variables.  It indicates that past 
environmental performance has a significant relationship with the 2009 environmental 
performance (r = .99, p < .001). This confirms that it is necessary to control for past 
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environmental performance when looking at the predictive effects of other variables on 
environmental performance.  We adopted a common practice in the economics and finance 
literature for controlling the instrumental effect of a dependent variable (e.g., Ahuja and Katila 
2001; Baum et al. 2007). Based on the logics of path dependency, a firm’s financial or social 
performance is heavily affected by its prior performance (Alarcon and Sanchez 2013). For 
example, a firm’s profitability in one year is often heavily influenced by its profitability the 
previous year and the resources and slacks generated by last year’s profitability. Thus, 
controlling the instrumental variable, i.e., previous ECSR, allows us to more accurately predict 
the changes in our dependent variable, which will be reflected by a high R-square.  
Environmental performance has a significantly positive relationship (r = .19, p < .05) with the 
lower-middle-income market only.  The lack of significant correlation of 2009 environmental 
performance with other market types may warrant further analysis. 
 Table 2 summarizes the hypothesis test results. Model 1 includes all covariates and shows 
that past environmental performance has a very strong relationship with 2009 environmental 
performance (β = .99, p < .001).  Model 2, in which we added the four market variables, 
indicates that the signs across all four market types are not the same: three are positive and 
statistically significant, while the fourth is negative, but not significant. Thus Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. No one isomorphic pressure dominates at all four income levels. The results indicate 
that sales in low-income nations have a positive relationship with ECSR (β = .04, p< .05), as do 
sales in low-middle-income nations (β = .04, p< .05).  Hypotheses 2 and 3 are thus supported.  
This suggests that exoisomorphic pressures to conform to global standards are dominant in both 
low-income and low-middle-income nations.  Consistent with our Hypothesis 4, sales in upper-
middle-income nations do not seem to affect ECSR (p>.10).  Sales in high-income nations, 
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however, seem to be strongly and positively related to ECSR (β = .09, p< .001).  This finding 
does not support our Hypothesis 5.   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 reports a high correlation between the upper-middle income and high-income 
markets (-0.60). The correction coefficient of 0.99 between past environmental performance and 
2009 environment performance is unusually high. Other correlation coefficients for different 
income categories are also high suggesting a problem of multicollinearity.  However, in all 
model testing, no Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in our moderation analysis was higher than 
2.34, far below the threshold value of 10 (Perrini et al. Tencati, 2007).  Thus, we believe that 
multicollinearity is not responsible for our findings. 
DISCUSSION 
Four of our five hypotheses are supported.  Though not all specifics were as we predicted, no one 
isomorphic pressure dominates at all four income levels. Doing business in low- and low-middle-
income nations is positively related with ECSR, but we found no significant relationship between 
doing business in upper-middle-income nations and ECSR.  However, we also found a strong 
positive relationship between doing business in wealthy nations and environmental performance.  
Thus it appears that MNEs do see ECSR as a means of increasing profits in high-income nations.   
 Our findings are consistent with the premise that MNEs are now proactive about ESCR, 
driven primarily by exoisomorphic pressures to meet global ECSR standards.  MNEs may be 
more aware of the profit potential associated with ECSR (McWilliams and Siegel 2011; Porter 
and Kramer 2011).  It could be that pressure from NGOs, home governments, and other 
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international efforts are altering the competitive landscape (Luxmore and Hull 2011; Miles et al. 
2002, 2004).  Perhaps stakeholders trust only MNEs with high environmental standards to enter 
countries with weak environmental regulations (Dam et al. 2007).  Firms with more sales in low-
income or lower-middle-income nations had higher scores on environmental performance than 
did firms with fewer sales in these nations.  Given that the companies in this sample are publicly 
held and thus particularly vulnerable to endoisomorphic pressure to maximize profits, a 
reasonable conclusion is that these MNEs consider a proactive approach of exceeding 
environmental standards to be the most profitable one (Mross and Rothenberg 2007; Porter and 
Kramer 2006, 2011). 
 Contrary to our arguments, sales in high-income nations are linked to ECSR.  It appears 
that exoisomorphic pressures in high-income nations are strong enough that practitioners in these 
nations strive to improve their environmental performance.  If reputation is a significant 
contributor to the financial rewards of environmental performance (McWilliams and Siegel 
2011), then environmental performance may be valued most in settings where reputation matters 
the most.  In the nations with highest standards and greatest focus on environmental impact, 
institutional pressure could yield the greatest rewards for responsible environmental behavior 
and the greatest penalties for poor environmental performance.  Meeting these standards might 
be challenging, but also rewarding.  Innovation and CSR in general are correlated (McWilliams 
and Siegel 2001), but innovations are more likely to occur when there is a market for them.  
Innovations related to environmental performance could thus be expected most often in high-
income nations.  Assuming reasonable levels of technical parity and absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990; Delmas et al. 2011; Hull and Covin 2010; Tang et al. 2012), firms active in 
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these settings may find frequent opportunities to observe and absorb new ECSR best practices 
(Aguilera-Caracuel, Hurtado-Torres et al. 2012). 
Our findings are based on data from 113 publicly held companies.  While this sample is 
larger than those in the case studies on which this study is built, it is still small enough that the 
results may not be broadly generalizable.  Reexamining our research questions with another 
sample, perhaps drawing on a different source than the ESG dataset, would address this issue. 
The environmental movement has been successful in recent years in part because 
pollution affects the entire planet – what happens to the environment elsewhere may feel local to 
people in high-income countries.  Self-interested citizens in such countries might be inclined to 
cause trouble for polluting companies, but to ignore other dimensions of CSR, such as human 
rights activities.  It would be instructive to see if these other dimensions are similarly impacted 
by the nations in which an MNE competes.  Also, since some environmental initiatives pay 
better than others (Campbell 2007), could first-mover status with a very profitable ECSR 
initiative let companies “double-dip” or “many-dip” by being first in multiple nations with 
expectations much lower than in their home country?   
The globalization of environmental-related institutional pressures from wealthy nations 
appears to have reached low-income and lower-middle-income nations, but upper-middle-
income nations appear to have resisted the imposition of the wealthier nations’ standards.  Why 
this should be so is another interesting research question.  If global exoisomorphic pressures for 
high ECSR were universally dominant, we would expect to see MNEs treating the environment 
the same regardless of where they were.  There is some evidence for a trend in this direction, 
both in the observation that MNEs are becoming more aware of the financial benefits of high 
environmental performance (Mross and Rothenberg 2007; Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011) and in 
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the fact that the “race to the bottom” in the poorest nations appears to have turned into a race to 
the top.  Upper-middle-income nations’ standards may be higher than those of lower-income 
nations, but there may be no exoisomorphic pressure to exceed those standards, perhaps because 
expectations have not been raised or because of corruption (Qerimi and Sergi 2012). 
 There is a darker alternative explanation to consider.  That data indicate firms active in 
lower-income nations tend to be more environmentally responsible may be a function of poor or 
missing information.  The MSCI ESG dataset has been used extensively to capture CSR and its 
dimensions since Waddock and Graves (1997) proposed and tested the dataset as an objective, 
reliable means of evaluating the social performance of publicly held companies.  But the dataset 
is based on available information.  While technology has improved the flow of information 
around the world, a toxic chemical spill or other environmental bad practice in sub-Saharan 
Africa might get less attention than the same practice in the Netherlands or some other high-
income country.  Some governments let companies get away with polluting if they have a 
financial interest in the success of the polluting companies, suggesting that governments and 
companies may collude to keep evidence of poor environmental performance from coming to 
light (Tang and Smith 2012).   
Not only environmental standards vary across nations, so do the levels of monitoring and 
compliance, and these variations in governance quality affect MNE behavior (Kolk and van 
Tulder 2010; Slangen and van Tulder 2009).  Some MNEs may have learned to seek out the 
nations that have the lowest monitoring and compliance expectations.  Corruption impedes 
economic development, implying a correlation between corrupt institutional settings and lower-
income nations (Qerimi and Sergi 2012).  Rather than being more responsible, MNEs may be 
getting away with more in low-income nations, partly because news from those nations rarely 
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reaches the rest of the world, and partly, perhaps, because they are so good at encouraging the 
“race to the bottom” (Arora and Dharwadkar 2011; Williamson et al. 2006) that their misdeeds 
go not only unpunished but unrecorded (Halter and de Arruda 2009).   They could even be 
outsourcing the pollution, establishing partnerships with local businesses unaffected by global 
exoisomorphic pressure and shielded by their own governments from negative repercussions of 
negative ESCR (Tang and Smith 2012). 
This darker alternative interpretation explains our findings disturbingly well:  MNEs 
pursue environmental performance in high-income countries, but not in other nations.  In upper-
middle-income nations, MNEs meet standards but do not try to exceed them.  Their 
environmental performance in poorer nations is bad, but so well concealed that they seem to be 
environmental contributors.  A related point is that our findings are based on sales in these 
countries.  More exploitive behavior might be seen among MNEs whose business in these poor 
nations is more focused on extracting natural resources, and thus they buy rather than sell.   
Technological barriers to transmitting information across the world may have diminished, 
but cultural and political barriers persist.  The same pressures that might drive a company to seek 
the more responsible path could also drive it to try harder to find ways to sweep its less 
responsible behavior out of sight.  Environmental performance benefits are more related to 
avoiding negative attention from outside entities than are the benefits of socially responsible 
practices concerning the treatment of employees or the creation of better products (Miles, et al. 
2002, 2004).  This makes environmental performance ideal for measuring corporate behavior in 
less-regulated lower-income nations, but it also means that our results need to be approached 
with caution.  Do they mean that corporations are contributors to the greater good in these 
countries, or that harmful, criminal actions are being effectively concealed?  We need further 
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scrutiny of whether these companies are good, or just good at not getting caught.  Environmental 
activists and business ethicists might even consider it an obligation to shine the light of inquiry 
more brightly into MNE activities in these nations. 
CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the exoisomorphic and 
endoisomorphic pressures on MNEs with respect to ECSR, and by empirically confirming the 
predicted effects using the World Bank approach to market classification developed by de Vita 
and Kyaw (2009).  Using data from the World Bank, Compustat, and ESG, we were able to 
analyze our hypotheses using complete data from 113 MNEs. 
The confirmation of our first hypothesis, that relationships between sales and 
environmental performance of MNEs differ in nations of different income levels, suggests that in 
nations of different income levels environmental performance differs in other ways as well.  The 
question of whether MNEs in low-income and middle-income nations are finding it easier to 
exceed environmental expectations or simply finding it easier to get away with pollution 
suggests at least one potential difference between polluting in a wealthy nation and a poor one.  
There may be others. 
That doing business in low- and middle-income nations is positively and significantly 
related to environmental performance – our second and third hypotheses – may seem 
counterintuitive to some.  We hope that this leads to further examination of the question, and of 
environmental performance among MNEs active in these countries.  Doing business in high-
income nations positively affects environmental performance, contrary to our expectations 
(Hypothesis 5).  This finding makes the predicted (Hypothesis 4) and empirically supported lack 
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of effect of doing business in upper-middle-income nations perplexing.  Why the U-shaped 
relationship? 
One possible answer is that endoisomorphism is responsible for environmental 
performance in low-income and middle-income nations, where exoisomorphic pressure is low, 
that endoisomorphic and exoisomorphic pressures are balanced in upper-middle-income nations, 
and that exoisomorphic pressure is higher than endoisomorphic pressure in upper-income 
nations, as shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
Figure 1 – Exoisomorphic and Edoisomorphic Pressures Across National Types 
(Endoisomorphic Pressure Contributes to Environmental CSR) 
 
Consistent with our results, this figure suggests that endoisomorphic pressure to be 
environmentally responsible is higher than exoisomorphic pressure in low- and middle-income 
nations, and is the cause of higher environmental CSR than expected.  While not explicitly 
researching the source of CSR activity, Blodgett et al. (2014) suggest that corpoarate 
performance goals are better attained for MNEs when environmental CSR activity exceeds local 
requirements in countries or regions with low standards.  In upper-middle-income nations, the 
exoisomorphic pressure is close enough to endoisomorphic pressure that neither has more effect 
– meaning that MNEs tend to simply follow local regulations here.  In high-income nations, 
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however, the exoisomorphic pressure is higher than the MNE’s internal standards, and the MNE 
is forced to conform to those standards. 
But our alternative interpretation discussed above is that MNEs are not actually being 
more environmentally socially responsible in low- and middle-income nations.  Figures 2 and 3 
below illustrate this possibility.  If this is correct, endoisomorphic pressure does not exceed 
exoisomorphic pressure in any country.  The pressure to do “good” in less wealthy nations is 
what drives environmental CSR, as it does in the wealthier nations.  But if this is so, why the 
performance differences we found?  The answer, we fear, is perhaps cynical. 
 
Figure 2 – Exoisomorphic and Edoisomorphic Pressures Across National Types 
(Endoisomorphic Pressure Matches Environmental CSR) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the possibility that endoisomorphic pressure has negligible effects on 
environmental CSR, perhaps rising to match the levels of external isomorphic pressure in upper-
middle and high-income nations.  Figure 3, below, illustrates the possibility that, with the 
exception of a few idiosyncratic companies, MNEs respond to exoisomorphic pressure, and 




Figure 3 – Exoisomorphic and Edoisomorphic Pressures Across National Types 
(Endoisomorphic Pressure Is Negligible) 
 
 This returns us to the possibility that MNEs are not actually more responsible in nations 
with poor environmental standards, or with poor enforcement of their standards.  They may 
simply find it easier to hide or outsource their misdeeds.  Our data reflect only observed 
behavior, not hidden crimes a company may have committed.  Companies such as Nike and 
Apple have occasionally gotten unwanted attention for the behavior of their suppliers in low-
income nations.  They were able to shift a portion of the blame by pointing out that the 
reprehensible behavior was committed by their business partners, not by them.  While Apple’s 
and Nike’s denials of any knowledge of their partners’ actions may be true, it seems plausible 
that other companies knowingly seek out such partners.  If local companies in low- and middle-
income countries willingly pollute and otherwise misbehave on behalf of their MNE partners, 
then the high environmental CSR scores of these MNEs is, while technically correct, a sign not 
of responsible behavior, but of skill at gaming the system.  As there is a powerful school of 
thought (Friedman 1970) that argues in favor of gaming any system to maximize shareholder 




A theoretical concern emerging from this study is that the long-discussed difficulty in 
obtaining accurate results may have recurred after having been considered adequately addressed 
ever since Waddock and Graves (1997) introduced the use of what was then called KLD data.  If, 
since these data were first introduced, companies have been analyzing the “test” and how it is 
scored, we should expect that the “test” (i.e., the KLD data) may have become less accurate.  
Archival data from the first few years they were collected, when few companies knew or cared 
about their KLD ratings, may be the most reliable data from the dataset.  An unexpected alternate 
source of information might also help obtain more accurate results. 
Practical implications vary for different stakeholders.  For MNEs and their lawyers, the 
practical implication, regrettably, may be that the most profitable approach to environmental 
CSR is to outsource pollution to a well-controlled partner in a nation with low exoisomorphic 
pressures.  For policy makers, the implication appears to be that current policy is not 
sophisticated enough to reward true environmental responsibility, though strong enough to 
conjure its appearance.  NGOs concerned about such matters may also take note that MNEs may 
still be outmaneuvering them, and consider adopting new tactics in response.  As to individuals, 
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Table 1  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mean -.12 .38 .56 .91 -.09 .79 .07 .05 .02 
Standard 
Deviation 




         
2. Slack -.01         
3.Size -.03 .45***        






















-.02 .05 -.02 .15 -.02 -.49*** .43*** .35***  
Note: 




Table 2  
Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable =  
2009 Environmental Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Beta Standard Error Beta Standard Error 
Slack .02 .03 .05 .03 
Size -.02 .03 -.03 .03 








  .09*** .09 
Upper-middle 
Income Market 
  -.01 .13 
Lower-middle 
Income Market 
  .04* .28 
Low Income 
Market 
  .04* .41 
 
R2 .97 .98 
Adj. R2 .97 .98 
F 927.14*** 547.61*** 
d.f. 112 112 
Δ R2  .01 
Δ F  5.73*** 
Δ d.f.  4 
Note: 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001, two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
